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INTRODUCfiON 
In 1972 a ne\..r runalgam::lted form of local government was 
established in the Winnipep, rer,ion replacing the Hetro style 
of government that had been operating over A decade. In 
addition, the new scheme included several new institutional 
wrinkles desip,ned to,achieve wider citizen involvement, and 
a decentralization of political control. 
Even though these changes are of recent vintage, the 
Winnipeg experiment can offer some useful evidence on the 
pert:fnence of institutional reform in local government. 
*Dr. Lloyd A>..vorthy is Director of the Iil!'ltitute of Urban 
Studies, University of Winnipeg and is also a member of· the 
Provincial Legislature in ~fanitoba. He has co-authored a 
study of the first two years of lllinnipep,' s experiment in 
local government, calle~ "Unicity: The Transi.tion". 
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Winnipeg is a city of just over half a million people 
constituting approximately half the population of the 
Province of Hanitoba. The greater part of all the goods 
and services produced in the province are generated in the 
\olinnipeg area and it provides tnost of the jobs and most of 
the tax revenues needed to run the province. 2 
HistoricAlly, there has been an underlying socio-
political consensus shaping the city's political environment. 
The business oriented Anglo-Saxons who ori~ina!ly dominated 
city government were firm believers. in "good government", 
"efficiency" and "business principles". They had strong 
feelings about keeping politics out of local government, 
and operating local government according to sound no-nonsense 
administrative procedures. The representatives from ethnic 
groups, primarily Ukrainian, German and Jewish, who have 
increasingly taken over municipal political posts seem to 
have an even stronger belief in these principles of non-
partisanship, efficiency and conservatism. 
Winnipeg is a slow growth city. The population increase 
in Winnipeg from 1966 to 1970 was only 5% as compared to 16% in 
Toronto, 15% in Vancouver, 16% in Edmonton, and 21% in Calgary. 3 
Thus, while Winnipeg's heterogeneity in population would seem to 
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indicate the development of a more divergent set of political 
values, the slow growth has promoted until just recently, the 
continuation of a tnore stable traditional outlook. The small 
property owners who make up a good part of Winnipeg population 
are concerned about basic services at low cost. As a result, 
local government has been characterized by its lack of involve-
ment in programs of social reform, the supportof civic good 
works and an overriding concern with keeping taxes low.4 
Beginning in the 1970's however, l.Jinnipeg began to feel 
the same kind of pressures for change that are generally part 
of the urban scene elsewhere in the country. Downtown renewal, 
transportation systems, suburban land development and the provision 
of public housing emerged as major issues. In addition, there 
is the particularly striking problem of substantial in-migration 
of Native people from rural areas. There is an estimated 30,000 
urban Native people residing in the core of the City, most of 
whom are on the lowest income scale. 5 
These developments have brought to the foreground an agenda 
of local issues complex and diffi'cult to resolve. Thus, just at 
the time when a new organization of local government was being 
introduced, the political, social and economic environment of 
the city was shifting and new political forces were coming into 
play. The degree to which the new institu:tions acted upon 
the new political climate raises important questions. Have the 
new institutions opened channels for the expression of new 
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political forces or has it consolidated the hold of the 
conservative, business oriented, political groups? Is the 
city able to plan and initiate innovative programs in response 
to changing conditions in its downtown core, or to meet problems 
posed by urban growth? These become, in part the real tests for 
measuring the impact of Winnipeg's new form of government. 
The Metro ~Et~ 
Winnipeg's new system is a successor to a form of local 
/ own time . government which in its was considered a reform. In 1960:~the 
Provincial Government introduced a two-tier Metropolitan form 
of government for l-linnipeg. 6 The division of~ powers between the 
separate municipalities and the Metropolitan Corporation was 
similar to the metro scheme of Toronto, with powers divided 
between the separate municipalities and a central Hetro Council. 
Unlike Toronto, the political representation on Winnipeg's 
Metro Council was not drawn from elected representatives of the 
respective municipalities. Instead, the city was divided into 
ten pie-wedged constituencies, each electing a separate councillor. 
This created a critical separation between the individual political 
jurisdictions, and the metro level, and enabled the politicians 
in the respective municipalities to evade all responsibility for 
the Metro operation. 
While there were certain major achievements in the area of 
public works and transportation, the history of the ten year 
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operation of Metro is one of unending disagreement between 
the City of Winnipeg led by Mayor Stephen Juba and the Metro 
Corporation. Many nasty words were exchanged and more seriously. 
many needed programs were stymied, particularly in sensitive 
areas such as the planning of the downtown and new transportation 
programs. Metro became a convenient political whipping boy for 
the City of Winnipeg and the Municipalities. It became clear 
to provincial leaders that major changes were necessary and a 
blue ribbon commis$ion headed by a former Conservative cabinet 
member was set up in 1966 to review the organization of local 
government. 
Before the Commission could report however. a provincial 
election was held and the New Democratic Party under Edward 
Schreyer took over. One of Schreyer's crunpaign commitments had 
been a pledge to set up some form of regional goverrunent. But. 
he was not going to trust a Tory-appointed Commission to give 
him advice. Instead •. a group of Toronto-based consultants 
were hired and in very short order - a matter of about one 
year - a very different kind of local government scheme for 
Winnipeg was propos~d. 
·/ U-
rn December. 1973. the Provincial Government produced a 
\~ite Paper outlining its plans for the reorganization of Winnipeg. 
a concept that quickly became labelled UNICITY. 
The \~i te Paper proposed the complete amalgamation of all 
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the municipalities. Council would be elected from forty-
eight single member wards, based on en electoral base of 
10,000 population. The Hayor was to be elected by a majority 
of Council members, a departure from the long-standing practice 
in the city of direct election by the populace at large, a move 
interpreted as an effort to create a parliamentary style 
government. 
The model of a parlimnentary-Cabinet style structure was 
also seen in the organization of Council and the Administration. 
There were to be committees dealing with finance, public works 
., 
and environment, but over the committees was to be a central 
Executive-Policy Committee composed of the Mayor and other 
Cotrmittee Chairmen, exercising functions of central policy-
tnaking coordination. The administrative arrangements paralleled 
this Cabinet-style executive structure. There were to be three 
commissioners for each of the committees and a Chief Commissioner 
as overall executive officer. All the Commissioners were gathered 
together in their own executive group or a Board of Commissioners 
to act as the staff arm to the Executive Policy Committee. The 
political link holding this executive policy making apparatus 
together was the Mayor who would have to hold the confidence of 
a majority on Council. 
In company with this centralizing, amalgamative arrangement, 
was a series of proposals designed to decentralize the political 
system and give the citizen greater access to government. The 
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lfhite Paper proposed the City be divided into thirteen 
community committee areas composed of between three to four 
wards. These were contained approximately within the boundaries 
of the old suburban municipalities, and within traditional 
neighbourhood designations within the old City of Winnipeg. 
The Community Committees had the power to supervise 
local administrative functions such as the running of local 
parks, playgrounds, and libraries, consider applications for 
zoning variances or development plans and advise the central 
council on the needs of the local area. Tied in with the 
Community Committees was another innovation called Resident 
Advisory Groups (RAGS). Resident Advisors were to be elected 
each year by private citizens in each of the Community Committee 
areas, and were to meet at least monthly with the Community 
Committee on issues of interest and importance to the local area. 
In this way the \Unnipeg system sought, in effect, to 
combine two very different goals. 1fhile some urban areas have 
had regional forms of government, and others have experimented 
with techniques for decentralizing the political system, the 
proposals for Winnipeg were designed to achieve both these goals 
with one integrated system, and this is what makes the·Winnipeg 
experience somewhat unique. 
Bi_l_l _ _l_~-~-_A_J_!y_!J r~_«!_ E.ls t~ 
After a six month period of public hearings and legislative 
debate the basic outline presented in the White Paper was adopted, 
8 
by the Provincial Legislature, btit only after a very 
significant change - a reversion back to direct election of 
the Mayor. Undoubtedly many lUnnipeg citizens were in favour 
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of this move, but the influence of Steve Juba, the incumbent 
Mayor of l~innipeg, who wanted to maintain the old method, 
cannot be discounted. Th~'change in the form of mayoralty 
election had a strong disruptive effect on the neatly laid 
out formula for strong executive leadership under the 
Parliamentary model, and resulted in a hybrid system of 
executive organization on Council. Other more limited modifi-
cations included a change from a forty-eight member to a fifty 
member council, changes in the number of members of the Council 
Committees and an increase in the base salary of the members. 
The Provincial Government selected October 6th, 1971 as 
election day for the new Council, with the new system officially 
to begin operation on January 1st, 1972. This hasty introduction 
of the new system was certainly ill-advised, compared to other 
local governnent reform procedures which seem to extend a 
lengthier transition period in order for administrators and 
politicians to ease into their jobs .9 In lUnnipeg, however, 
it was a case of a crash introduction to the new system, 
whatever the consequences. 
UNICITY: ITS PERFORMANCE 
Rule by the Suburbs 
9 
\o1hat has been the effect of reorganization on Winnipeg? 
First, there have been iwportant political consequences. 
In the November election, a group named the Independent Civic 
Election Committee gairted thirty-seven out of the fifty seats. 
The I.C.E.C. is a non-socialist, norma1ly non-partisan group 
involving political people who, in provincial or federal 
politics, would be Conservatives or Liberals. The elections 
for Unicity Council, following closely on the surprise victory 
of the N.D.P. provincially, in 1969, was treafed with deadly 
seriousness by the anti-socialist, business groups in the city, 
resulting in a strong organizational effort and a well funded 
campaign by the I.C.E,C. The N.D.P., which had made a strong 
showing in \"innipe~ during the provincial election managed to 
elect only seven. Independents won in five wards, the Communists 
in one. 
In the second civic election held in 1974, the I.C.E.C. 
maintained its hold on Council but_ lost eight seats to a 
disparate opposition made up of the N.D.P., some independent 
and a new grouping called the Civic Reform Coalition. 
The reorganization of government was a major factor in 
giving the I.C.E.C. its strong hold on Council and reinforcing 
the position and power of the suburban .property owning consti-
tuency represented by the I.C.E.C. There are those who contend 
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that the real source of power in city politics is the 
property-development industry. 10 . But, the importanc~ of the 
property owninR taxpayer who rer,ards his-sinr,le family home 
as his castle, and who supports the political group that will 
~erve his interests, should not be overlooked, especially in 
a city like \Unnipeg where they make up the majority of electors. 
One could postulate for example, that if the boundaries 
separating the former old City of Winnipeg from suburban muni-
cipalities had been retained, and had the downtown area continued 
to become populated with a more mobile group of highrise residents, 
whose political outlook is more reform minded·then the prospect 
of reform urban populist type councillors coming to dominate 
council at least in the jurisdiction of the central city would 
have increased - perhaps duplicating the situation in Toronto. 
As it is, however, the I.C.E.C. majority on Council is heavily 
dominated by suburban members and they control cormnittee 
appointments and have the edge in voting strength.ll In fact, 
two inner city councillors elected under the I.C.E.C. banner 
in 1974 have since resigned from t_he caucus over the issue of 
suburban domination. 
As one city hall reporter notes: "Suburban councillors 
generally want new residential development in their areas, major 
commercial development in the downtown area and an efficient 
11 
transportation system, private or public, connecting the 
two centers of activity. Their interests are in direct 
conflict to Inner City Councillors who see protection of 
established neighbourhoods and redevelopment of deteriorated 
. . 12 
areas as prime concerns. 11 
The reorganization then has had its influence on the 
priorities of the city and the policies it has adopted. In 
contrast to other Canadian cities which are showing signs of 
some concern over the environmental damage caused by major 
development projects, Winnipeg City Council has provided 
support and subsidization of large scale development, premised 
on the need for generating further tax revenue. There has 
also been a noticeable lack of attention paid to matters of 
low cost housing, and a d1sregard for economic or social 
development policies that would meet the needs of native 
people who have migrated to the central city. 
Preliminary breakdown of budget figures show expenditure 
on matters such as recreation, capital works and maintenance 
being disproportionately allocated to suburban areas. While 
in part this might be explained in terms of the suburban growth 
in population requiring heavier investment in public works, it 
doesn't account for the neglect shown towards the older parts 
of \olinnipeg. Reorganization has influenced a choice of civic 
priorities favouring suburban residents and against those of 
the inner city. 
12 
_F._i_.c;_~a_l __ _Adm 1 n i_~_t_r_a_ t_!_v_e _ _R~!;_t~l_t_!_ 
The results of the reorganization on the financial and 
administrative side of city government have been mixed. On 
the plus side the equalization of mill rates immediately 
brought greater equity in the fiscal system of the city. 
Formerly, wealthy suburbs had relatively low mill rates 
because they could utilize services provided by the central 
city. In 1972 this came to an end and they had to pay 
their fair share. For example, the suburb of Tuxedo, a 
very high income area, had its mill rates ~o up by 40% 
compared to only a minor increase for the Central city. 
In other areas the results are less clear. The general 
assessment by politicians, administrators and citizens alike 
is that the delivery of basic services has neither declined 
nor improved, although there are some complaints from residents 
of former suburban areas that services such as road_ repair or 
13 
snow clearance are not as efficient. 
l3 
At the same time critics of the new system were right 
when they claimed that the costs of amalgamation would be 
high. Even taking into account the normal annual increase 
in costs and the necessary start-up costs of a new system. 
city officials have admitted that bringing services up to 
common standard. will cost the city substantially more. 14 
Time will only tell whether through amalgamation the general 
le'-'el of sertice will be improved. 
Centralize«! Planning and Control 
The more serious question flowing from a centralization 
of authority is whether it has led to an improved system of 
planning and development control. A major complaint under 
the old system was the confustion and delay caused by having 
several jurisdictions responsible for matters of. subdivision 
approval. zoning control, supply of new land services. The 
new arrangements have in some ways made the old system look 
like a veritable model of efficiency. 
The most serious trouble has-been in housing. Bill 36 
introduced a series of new requirements to provide a greater 
degree of public protection on subdivision plans and zoning 
variations through public bearings and administrative control. 
The end result was a process requiring ninety different 
procedural acts, doubling the time for approval. This has 
been a contributing cause to a serious housing shortage and 
-- -----------------------------------------------------------~---------------------------------
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escalation in cost in th~ Winnipeg area, at least in the 
view of the housebuilding industry. 16 
In the area of downtown development, however, the Act 
did achieve its goal of more effective decision making, albeit 
with questionable results. Prior to 1971 both the City of 
Winnipeg and the Metro Corporation had their respective plans 
for revitalizing the downtown core. Both plans were predicated 
on major commercial high rise development, but there was a· 
stalemate in execution because of the political differences. 
Under the new unified system the pro-development forces from 
the old Metro Council, City Council and suburban councils work 
together, and have made a series of decisions in support of 
major downtown development projects. Many of these have been 
passed with little scrutiny, with one 100 million dollar 
project involving complicated land transfer from the city 
being approved in a matter of four days from the time it was 
proposed by the developer.l7 
To counter this unfettered spree of development, some 
citizen groups have tried to impose the requirement of envir.on-
mental impact studies on major public works, a little noticed 
provision of Bill 36. For the first fmo~ years of operation under 
I 
the new Act, administrators of the City didn't bother to apply 
the environmental impact requirements. But under pressure from 
the citizen's groups it has been applied, slm-1ing up or altering 
some projects. This has prompted the Executive Policy Committee 
into efforts to ask the Provincial Government to rescind the 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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environmental impact requirements under the Act, so the 
eventual use of this planning tool is uncertain.1 8 
In the matter of regional land use and transportation, 
the unified system has not yet had a chance to fully demon-
strate its worth. In 1974 City Council did pass two major 
proposals. One was plans for major shopping center locations 
in the suburban areas. This occasioned a sharp conflict 
between suburban councillors who were for the plan and the 
Commissioner of Environment who originally tried to limit 
such development. In the second case the Council has passed 
some control on land use in the additional zone around 
around Winnipeg, utilizing the technique of large lot zoning. 
Without cotnr.~enting on the worth of each decision, they would 
appear to have been achieved more readily under the unified 
system rather than under the old metro system. 
In transportation planning, the network of expressway 
systems adopted by the old Metro Council (W.A.T.S.) have after 
in~reasing public opposition been rejected by the new Council. 
Nothing new has been offered in replacement and it can ot be 
stated at this point in time whether the new system will in 
fact effect the implementation of a regional transportation 
network. 
There are some signs, however, of positive movement in 
this area. The city has introduced experimental Dial-a-Bus 
and free downtown shuttle bus services, and has joined with 
senior levels of government in developing a high speed transit 
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route using a railway co.rridor. As well, there appears to be 
the beginnings of closer coordination of land use and 
transportation planning~ and a new development plan is 
expected that should show the results of an integrated 
approach. 
While these are good signs, there is looming a more 
serious concern - the problem of administrative accountability. 
Any governmental agency that takes the issue of accountability 
seriously must demonstrate that it meets the requirements 
of inform ng citizens, that there is an open procedure for 
receiving citizen complaints, and that the agency makes its 
choiees based on citizen preference. These requirements are 
not being met in the Winnipeg system, particularly as a result 
of the erosion or disappearance of local community ~ffice 
employees and an increasing concentration and centralization 
of staff downtown. 
A prime example of this occurred when the Board of Commiss-
ioners proposed and Council accepted a plan for establishing a 
system that divided the city into-six districts for the purpose 
of administering city services. Such an arrangement is a direct 
contradiction of the Community Committee formula and clearly 
indicates that the chief administrators of the City are disre-
garding the intentions of the Act which souRht to provide some 
degree of local control and supervision over the delivery of 
services. It thus raises the question of just how well the 
UBRARY 
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the goal of greater citizen contact and access to city 
government has been achieved. 
Electoral Involvement 
The new ~;ystem was designed to encourage participation 
by citizens in two ways. First, by increasing the electoral 
involvement of citizens and adding to minority representation 
through the small ward system. In this it has been no more 
19 
successful than other local governments. It appeared from 
the sixty percent turnout in the first election that progress 
ha been made. In the second election, .turnout fell to thirty-
five percent, about the level under former municipal schemes. 
20 People vote when there is a competition of people or issues. 
The reorganization of local government, at least in Winnipeg, 
has had limited effect in inducing such competition. In fact 
the 1974 election saw ten council seats filled by acclamation. 
While there are many suggestions on how to increase voter 
awareness in municipal elections, it appears that the particular 
design of the Winnipeg system is not necessarily one of them. 
To be fair the turnout in civic e~ections held in supposedly 
reform--minded cities such as Toronto and Vancouver is no 
better! 
The second way of improving cittzen.involvernent and 
perhaps the most heralded aspect of the new government system 
in Winnipeg was the Community Committee - Resident Advisory 
system, designed to give local citizens close contact and 
access to city dicision makers. This was to be a continuing 
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institutional framework whereby private citizens could 
advise councillors on matters affecting the local neigh-
bourhood. 
The Resident Advisory Groups began well. Over four 
hundred people were active in the initial thirteen resident 
advisory groups with membership ranging in each from about 
twenty to over two hundred in one. They organized themselves 
usually into committees corresponding to the committees on 
Council, i.e., works and operations, environment finance, and 
several undertook special tasks such as neighbourhood planning 
projects. Most of the resident advisors were people who had 
been community activists previously and who now saw in the 
21 R.A.G.'s a new vehicle to pursue their concerns. 
The work of the Resident Advisors however, was seriously 
constrained by a lack of resources and support from either the 
City Administration or the Provincial Government. Very technical 
documents were referred to the R.A.G.s; many tasks of neigh-
bourhood contact and communication were left to the volunteer 
citizen members by councillors, all without any significant 
staff or financial help. 
This reflected the generally unenthusiastic attitude by 
most city councillors and administrators towards R.A.G.s. In 
a survey conducted among councillors, when asked if R.A.G.s 
should be given additional support, fifty percent said no, 
22 thirty-four percent said yes. Council has never seriously 
discussed the role of R.A.G.s or citizen involvement generally. 
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It appears that they are viewed as apart from the normal 
governing process. 
In part, this view is deserved. R.A.G. members themselves 
admit that they have not been very successful in communicating 
with their respective communities, nor in involving many citizens. 
Because of strong dominance of citizen activists, R.A.G.s often 
found themselves talking about matters of little interest to 
the general population. As a result they become marked as a 
forum for the "troublemakers11 • 23 
The R.A.G.s however, have shown at times that they can be 
an effective forum for citizens. On those occasions when addi-
tional outside resources available from university groups, 
private planning organizations or community development agencies 
were made available, the Resident Advisors have played an 
effective role. In three inner city community areas the R.A.G.s 
have become sponsors of neighbourhood planning ventures which 
have involved residents in determining the planning options for 
their own area. In another case the R.A.G.s became the forum 
where serious public opposition was raised to a combined federal, 
provincial, municipal plan for railway relocation. A coalition 
of citizen groups and social agencies using research material 
from a university-based transportation economist opposed the 
plans and through a series of presentations in various community 
committee-resident advisory meetings were able to mount enough 
opposition to have the original proposals stopped and sent back 
for reworking by the consultants. 
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These signs of vitality in the new nei hbourhood structures 
are limited, however to a few areas of the city. In general the 
R.A.G.s are slowly declining in influence and involvement by 
citizens. In fact some councillors publicly have already called 
for an abolition of the system and many councillors and civic 
administrators privately see little use for the system. 24 Citizens 
are not aware of the existence of the R.A.G.s and make virtually 
no use of the institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
., 
The impact of reforms in Winnipeg's scheme of local 
government will continue to unfold in patterns presently 
undetected. Therefore judgments on its performance must be 
tentative. Certain preliminary observations about the 
Winnipeg experience, however, can be offered. 
First, it is obvious that too much is expected of 
institutional reform. There has been a tendency, particularly 
noticeable amongst Canadian provincial governments to use local 
government reform as the placebo for urban ills. The prescriptions 
of an older generation of political scientist that reorganizing 
local government will solve problems of ineffective decision 
making, inefficient administration, apathy by the populace, 
have been adopted by provincial governments in New Brunswick, 
Quebec, Ontario and tmnitoba, and have led to major efforts at 
government reorganization. In fact this provincial tinkering 
with the machinery of local govern~ent seems preferable to 
undertaking major political action on land use, transportation, 
tax reform, and planning. 
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Yet, the case of Winnipeg shows that reorganizing into 
a regional scheme may have limited effect on the delivery 
of services and does not carry by itself the means of 
achieving good regional planning. A strategy of wholesale 
change in the system involving a good deal of disruption 
25 
may be less useful than specific institutional corrections. 
It is also important to realize that the impact local 
government reorganization has on a city is secondary to the 
impact of actions by senior levels of government. What the 
federal government decides in matters of housing legislation, 
airport location, tax incentives for industry; has a much 
greater impact on the economics and social health of an urban 
region than any local government reform. What the provincial 
government might do in the way of alleviating property tax 
burden, the kind of aid given for urban transportation, the 
land use controls on the urban periphery, the location of 
provincial offices and facilities can affect a city much more 
vitally than the imposition of a metro or a regional government 
scheme. Focusing therefore on local government reform can 
become a case of misplaced priorities. 
This is not to suggest that institutional change should 
be ignored, as it has a major role in 
influencing the division of political power within a city. 
While the basic social political forces are not changed by 
the institutional system, their form of expression is channeled 
differently by new institutional frameworks, and this will have 
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a strong impact on the policy choices of the city. In Winnipeg 
reorganization brought about a political system highly oriented 
toward the concerns of suburban residents, an outcome quite the 
reverse of the intentions of the original Unicity proposal. 
Another area where institutional arrangements can be 
important, but where usually little attention is paid, is in 
the design of structures appropriate for dealing with the 
inter-governmental arrangements of the city. Few cities, 
Winnipeg included, have structures designed specifically for 
the task of dealing with senior levels of government, of 
relating to rural municipalities on the borders, or for 
undertaking many of the myriad functions that a city must 
perform in a complex intergovernmental system. 
On the other end of the scale, institutional reorganization 
also has an important role in overcoming the growing estrange-
ment between individual citizens and government. Traditional 
political activity is often seen by private citizens as meaning-
less. Government adminsitration and planning is not responsive 
or accountable. 
In Winnipeg, innovative steps were taken to overcome these 
problems. But, unfortunately, the good intentions of, the Act 
were never carried through. The Resident Advisory Groups were 
not given any real assistance in the crucial first stage of 
their operation. Civic administrators, hostile to the idea 
of decentralization or any form of citizen control were allowed 
to establish administrative districts that run counter to 
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co11111unity committee or resident advisory systems. City 
politicians and the Provincial Government were half-hearted 
in setting forth the goals of citizen involvement and have 
never established an action program for developing a 
meaningful form of public participation. 
Many innovative techniques were open to them - neighbourhood 
development corporations, community information systems, urban 
resource centers. But, thej ·were never tried. 
The Winnipeg reorganization was old fashioned reform. It 
was primarily designed to overcome problems of fragmentation. 
and of achieving some governmental unity in pl~nning and 
administration. In these endeavors it met with some success, 
but not enough to warrent the disruption that was caused, or 
the bureaucratic centralization that has become part of the new 
system. A more serious omission was that the reform did little 
to meet problems of inter-governmental relations, of citizen 
activism, of social and economic development, of decentralizing 
authority and power, of the need for new managerial techniques 
and reorganization. While lip service was paid to such concerns 
in the original White Paper, the actual design of the new 
system fell short of the mark. 
The Winnipeg case also shows that a shift of attention 
from local government to provincial and federal governments 
might be a more productive strategy in gaining solutions to 
urban problems. LPcal government is basically the provider 
of services. It does not have the scope nor the resources to 
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tackle the critical issues of urban growth, planning, 
transportation, economic development and social policy. 
These are matters for senior levels of government. Yet 
a great deal of energy is expended fussing over local 
government reform. 
In fact, if there is to be government reform, it might 
better occur on the senior levels of government. Provincial 
governments could use new institutional forms to order land 
use, to enable citizens to plan their communities, to have 
low income housing programs that are in tiated and managed 
by the occupants. The federal government should be working 
out ways of altering the immigration flows from the major 
urban centers and distributing economic activity more evenly 
across the country. 
A careful look at the Winnipeg experience provides some 
useful lessons. First that local government reform is an 
overrated undertaking. And, secondly, when it is undertaken 
it should be aimed at goals very different from the traditional 
exercise of setting up a: regional, centralized system. If such 
a lesson can be learned from the Winnipeg case, then it was a 
worthwhile experience. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The material is drawn from a more extensive study undertaken 
by the Institute of Urban Studies at the University of 
l.Jinnipeg, published in the spring of 1974, although some 
new data has been added. See Lloyd Axworthy, James Cassidy, 
Unicity: The Trans!tion, (lo7innipeg: Institute of Urban 
Studies, University of Winnipeg, 1974). 
2. Government of Manitoba, "Proposals for Urban Reor~anization 
in the Greater Winnipeg Area", December 1970, p.2. 
3. See the Globe and Mail, Toronto, November 9 1971. 
4. Winnipeg has a rate of 60% single family horne ownership. 
For a discussion of how population characteristics, including 
property ownership influence political behavior and policy 
outcomes, see: Edmund P. Fowler, Robert Lineberry, "The 
Comparative Analysis of Urban Policy: Canada and the United 
States'', Harlan Hahn, ed., People and Politics in Urban Society, 
(Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1972)'. 
5. Don McCaskill, "Migration, Adjustment and Integration of the 
Indian into the Urban Environment", unpublished Masters Thesis, 
Carlton University, 1970. 
6. Up to 1960 the urban region of Winnipeg had been divided into 
government between a central City of Winnipeg and a group of 
surrounding municipalities, along with a number of regional 
boards and commissions looking after water supply and public 
transit. For discussion of the situation pre-Metro, and an 
expanded history of the Metro years, see: Ceor~e Rich, 
"Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years" in Ralph Krueger 
and Charles Bryfogle, eds., Urban Problems, (Toronto: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 359.-----
1. For a collection of views on the meaning of the White Paper 
proposals, see Lloyd Axworthy, ed., The Future City,(Winnipeg: 
The Institute of Urban Studies, The University of Winnipeg, 
1971). 
8. For an amplification of survey results see Axworthy, Cassidy, 
~· cit. 
9. For example, in Britain orientation periods of two to three 
years were set aside for councillors and administrators to 
develop an understanding of reform structure and organize 
traditional techniques. See Joyce Land, Alan Norton, 
§_etting Up New Authorities, (London: Charles Night and Co., 
1972). 
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10. See James Lorimer, The Real World of City Politics, 
(Toronto: James, Lewis, and Samuels, 1972). 
11. Eight out of ten members of the Executive Policy 
Committee are from the suburbs. 
12. Robert Matas, "Ghost of Metro Lingers on Council", 
(Winnipeg: The Winnipeg Tribune, November 9 1974). 
13. This is based on a series of interviews with public 
officials and a survey of the populace. A more com-
prehensive assessment of administrative performance of 
the new system is difficult to achieve at such an early 
stage, although work has now begun by the author in 
analysing budget changes. See Axworthy, Cassidy, 
.Qp_. cit., P• 38, 39. 
14. In the Winnipeg Free Press, October 18 1974, Chief 
Stewart stated that the cost for unifying the police 
force would be an additional $400,000.02· 
15. See "Building Sites: A Prime Component of Housing", a 
report prepared by Underwood McLellan for ~he Winnipeg 
Housebuilders' Association, 1973, p. 29. 
16. Ibid., pp. 22-25. · 
17. "City's Trizec Study Tak~s a Beating" (Winnipeg: The 
Winnipeg Free Press, December 20 1974). · 
18. See Lloyd Axworthy, Don Epstein, "Urban Populism", a 
paper presented to Canadian Studies Conference, (Toronto) 
June, 1974. 
19. Some individual instances of minority representation did 
occue. In the first election the director of the lndian-
Metis Friendship Center was ~lected in a downtown ward. 
He declined to run for ·a second term but his seat was won 
by a representative of the Chinese community. 
20. Sydney Verba, Norman H. Nie, Participation in America, 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972). 
21. Lloyd Axworthy, J. Cassidy, Unicity: The Transition, 
(Win ireg: The Institute of U ban Studies, The University 
of Winnipeg, 1974), p. 117. 
22. Jbid., p. 117. 
23. For a discussion of the issue differences between citizen 
activists and general range of citizens see Verba and Nie, 
pp. cit., Chapter 5. 
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24. See Robert Matas, "Citizen Role in Big City Government 
to be Scrapped", (Winnipeg: The Winnipeg Tribune, 
November 16, 1972). 
25. For comments on this point, see Edward Basefield, 
James Q. Wilson, City Politics, (New- York: Vintage 
Books, 1966); J. K. Friend, J. M. Power, C. J. Yewlett, 
Public Planning: The Inter Corporate Dimension, 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1974); Norton Long, 
The Unwalled CitY-,(New York: Basic Books, 1972); and 
Scott Greer, The Urbane View, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 197~-
26. See Harlan Hahn, "Reassessing and Revitalizing Urban 
Politics", in Harlan Hahn, ed., People and Politics in 
an Urban Society, (London: Sa~e Publications, 1971). 
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